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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the drawbacks of China’s current rural land system (the House-
hold Contract System based on the collective ownership) mainly from the perspectives of con-
tract, property rights and resource allocation. This article defines the Household Contract 
System as a lease where the collective (landowner) leases land to its members to farm inde-
pendently. The drawbacks of China’s current rural land system mainly include instability of 
the peasants’ land use right and insecurity of their land income right weakening peasants’ 
enthusiasm for investment in land, and a lot of restrictions on the transfer of peasants’ land 
leases obstructing the flows and optimized allocation of labor, land and capital. According 
to analysis, the drawbacks of China’s current rural land system result mainly from the col-
lective ownership and the government-run nature of the collective. This article then makes 
and elaborates the proposition of the privatization of rural land to peasants. It also analyzes 
the government’s land rights in private ownership of land and refutes the popular arguments 
against the privatization of rural land.
Keywords 
land system; Household Contract System; lease; collective ownership; property rights; 
peasant private ownership
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1. INTRODUCTION
Rural land is owned by the collectives. The collective-owned land is contracted 
(in essence, tenanted) and farmed by the collective members. The remaining (out-
put minus rent minus taxes) goes to the peasants. This is main content of China’s 
current rural land system (the Household Contract System). In the system, the peas-
ant-owned exclusive residual claim1 stimulates peasants’ enthusiasm to work, which 
overcomes the members’ shirking in the People’s Commune  (See section 3.1). In the 
1980s, the system promoted a rapid increase in agricultural output, supporting the 
rapid growth of China’s economy.
But since the late 1990s, China’s current rural land system gradually exposed 
serious drawbacks, mainly including instability of the peasants’ land use right and 
insecurity of income right weakening peasants’ enthusiasm for investment in land, 
and a lot of restrictions on the transfer of peasants’ land leases obstructing the flows 
and optimized allocation of labor, land and capital (See chapter 2). Much has been 
written about its drawbacks. Researchers have proposed different reform schemes 
on China’s rural land system: first, the improvements to the current rural land sys-
tem in the framework of the collective ownership. Some people advocate peasants’ 
emphyteusis and transfer rights over the emphyteusis (Chi, 2002; Zhang, 2002; 
Dang, 2002). Some people propose to change the three-level (town, village, Vil-
lager Group) collective ownership into the village collective ownership (Xiao, 1999; 
X. Zhang, 2013). Some people advocate Co-ownership by Shares (Han, 2004). Some 
people propose land stock cooperative system (the collective land is converted into 
shares of individual peasants; the peasants have the rights to income and transfer 
over land stock) (Shu, 2006; Wang, 2013). These improvements can, to varying de-
grees, ease but not eliminate the drawbacks of China’s current rural land system fun-
damentally, for example, the collective violating peasants’ land rights by virtue of its 
monopoly position in the Household Contract System (See section 2.1.2).
Second, nationalization and peasants’ emphyteusis (Du, 2003, p. 207; Zhang, 
2003; Zhou, 2004). Nationalization can greatly reduce the collective ability and 
chance to encroach peasants’ land rights. Peasants’ emphyteusis overcomes the in-
stability of land use rights. But this system faces a multi-agent problem (governments 
at all levels exercise ownership on behalf of the state), while it may strengthen the 
government’s role, and weaken the market’s role in the allocation of land resources.
Third, privatization of rural land to peasants (Yang, 2002; Cai and Fang, 2005; 
Zhou, 2006, p.92; Wen, 2008; Yu and Chen, 2008; Qin, 2009). This proposal caused 
a great deal of misunderstanding and criticism.
In this article, we argue that the Household Contract System is essentially a lease 
where the collective (landowner) leases its land to its members to independently 
1 As discussed in section 2.1.2 (2), in the system, the collective monopoly on rent formulation results in 
increasing land rent, which severely weakens the peasants’ residual claim.
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farm. The drawbacks of China’s current rural land system (the Household Contract 
System) result mainly from the collective ownership and the government-run nature 
of the collective. Based on this understanding, we advocate the privatization of rural 
land to peasants.2
This article begins with an analysis on the drawbacks of China’s current rural 
land system from the perspectives of contract, property rights and resource alloca-
tion. We then present and clarify our proposition on the reform of rural land system. 
Then we refute some of the arguments against the privatization of rural land.
2. THE DRAWBACKS OF CHINA’S CURRENT RURAL LAND 
SYATEM
Since the late 1990s, China’s current rural land system exposed serious draw-
backs.
2.1 Instability of the Peasants’ Land Use Right and Insecurity of Income 
Right
2.1.1 Continuous adjustment of the peasants’ Contracted Land
It’s necessary to adjust the members’ Contracted (Tenanted) Land and amend 
land leases with the changes in the collective population in a lease period, because 
the collective members have an equal right to contract (in essence, tenant) the col-
lective-owned land. But this adjustment inevitably sacrifices the stability of the peas-
ants’ land use right. According to a survey in 2008, the peasants’ Contracted Land of 
63.7 per cent of the surveyed villages was adjusted during 1997 to 1999; and 34.6 per 
cent after 1999 (Dou, 2013). 
2.1.2 Collective monopoly in the Household Contract System
With no competitors as the only lessor, the collective is in a monopoly position 
in the Household Contract System, which is mainly manifested in the following two 
cases. (1) Some collectives forced peasants (lessee) to transfer their land leases (land 
contract rights). According to a survey in 2011, 64.04 per cent of the leases where 
businesses rent peasants’ Contracted Land were signed under the pressure of the vil-
lage committee or township government (Ye and Tian, 2013). 
 (2) The collective monopoly on land rent formulation. Until 2006, peasants had 
to pay two kinds of fees: First, the clearly defined agricultural tax, which was can-
celed 1 Jan. 2006. Second, the ill-defined land rent, which seriously weakened the 
income rights of peasants. Statistically, in China from 1996 to 1999 the peasants’ 
per capita fees (excluding volunteer work) amounted ￥126.60, ￥143.90, ￥152.80, 
2 As discussed in section 2.1.2 (2), in the system, the collective monopoly on rent formulation results in 
increasing land rent, which severely weakens the peasants’ residual claim.
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￥140.10 (L. Zhang, 2013), accounting for 13.26 per cent, 14.74 per cent, 15.87 per 
cent, 15.26 per cent of per capita agricultural net income of rural residents respec-
tively (NBSC). And the burden on peasants in many regions is well above the national 
average. According to the survey of Cao (2000) on two villages in Yongxing County, 
Hunan Province, in H village per capita fees amounted to ￥179.01, accounting for 
50.23 per cent of per capita agricultural income; in B village per capita fees amounted 
to ￥238.70, accounting for 69.18 per cent. In a competitive land tenure market, land 
rent is determined by the competition and negotiation between the lessor and the 
lessee. However, in the Household Contract System, the collective is a monopolist of 
rent formulation, while the peasant is just a recipient of land rent, which is why there 
has been an increasing land rent before 2006. 
2.1.3 Government monopoly in supply of urban construction land and in 
land expropriation
Since the 1990s, the government’s enclosing land has been intensifying for the 
following reasons. Firstly, most of the land whether for public interest or non-public 
interest in urbanization can only be the land expropriated by the government, be-
cause the collective land can not be transferred for non-agricultural construction 
(Article 63, Land Administration Law of the PRC). The legal restrictions on the pur-
pose of the public interest of the expropriation (Article X, The Constitution of the 
PRC) are like an empty text.
Secondly, the benefit from the price difference between land expropriation 
and sale is the power of the government enclosing land. On the one hand, the col-
lective land can not be transferred for non-agricultural construction. Any organi-
zation or individual can only apply for state-owned land to meet its or his demand 
for construction land (See Article 43, Land Administration Law of the PRC). These 
provisions establish a government monopoly on urban land, which leads to more ex-
pensive urban land. China’s Land Resources Bulletin shows that China’s urban land 
prices have been rising since 2001. The average annual growth rate of the average 
land price in major cities was 5.36 per cent from 2001 to 2012. The average land price 
in 105 major cities amounted to ￥3129/m2 in 2012. 
On the other hand, China’s current rural collective is a government-run organi-
zation established by the government in the 1950s, not a free union of peasants. It is 
still largely subordinate to the government, though nominally self-governed so far, 
which determines the government monopoly in the expropriation of collective land, 
because a collective subordinate to the government can not (individual peasants 
without the right to freedom of association are less likely to) reciprocally negotiate 
with the government. The government monopoly in the expropriation of collective 
land leads to a cheap land compensation. According to a survey in 2011, in the land 
expropriation the average compensation that the village collective got was ￥24,980/
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Mu (1Mu≈666.7m2), landless peasants got only ￥17,256/Mu (Ye and Tian, 2013), 
only 3.21 per cent and 2.22 per cent of the average price that the government sold 
land respectively. 
The government’s growing enclosure of land has consequences. Firstly, it in-
tensifies instability of the peasants’ land use right. According to a survey, 43.26 per 
cent of the villages experienced land expropriation since 1995 (Ye and Tian, 2013). 
Secondly, a lot of farmland is enclosed. A large number of peasants lose land and 
become unemployed refugees. The expropriated land only for the urban construc-
tion amounted to 20.97 million Mu (1.398 million hectares) only from 2004 to 2012 
(NBSC), which caused landless peasants estimated at about 15 million. The trans-
fer of employment is difficult for landless peasants because they are mainly elderly 
peasants with little education (in China today, most literate young peasants work in 
the city). According to the survey, the unemployment rate in the landless peasants 
amounts to 25.92 per cent (Xu, 2013). 
Thirdly, illegal events and mass incidents occur frequently in the government’s 
growing enclosure of land, endangering social stability. The lack of effective con-
straints on government results in a lot of illegal events in the expropriation, transfer, 
and the use of land. According to China’s Land Resources Bulletin, 626,032 cases on 
illegal land use were found, involving 414,163 hectares of land, from 2006 to 2012. 
The criminal officials reached 3297 only in the special land inspection from 2007 to 
2011. Peasants are often forced to take drastic measures, such as group resistance, to 
defend their rights because of government monopoly in the land expropriation. Ac-
cording to Social Blue Book published by China’s Academy of Social Sciences in 2013, 
nearly half of tens of thousands of pieces of mass incidents in China each year re-
sulted from the land expropriation. 
Fourthly, cheap compensation in land expropriation leads to inefficient use 
of land. From the land productivity, statistically, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Guangzhou 
are ranked as the top three in China, but Shenzhen’s just 1/5 of Singapore’s, 1/10 of 
Tokyo’s; Shanghai’s just 7 per cent of Tokyo’s, 24 per cent of Paris’s, 27 per cent of 
Seoul’s; Guangzhou’s just 1/17 of Hongkong’s, 1/18 of Singapore’s, 1/32 of Seoul’s (Yu, 
2013).
Instability of the peasants’ land use right and insecurity of income right above 
weaken peasants’ enthusiasm for investment in land. According to a survey in 2011, 
only 30.11 per cent of the surveyed peasants made medium- and long-term invest-
ments in their Contracted Land (Ye and Tian, 2013).
2.2 China’s Current Rural Land System Conflicting with the Optimized 
Allocation of Resource 
In China’s current rural land system, a peasant’s right to contract (tenant) the 
collective-owned land is based on his status as a member of the collective (See Ar-
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ticle 14 of Land Administration Law of PRC). If a peasant quits the collective and 
becomes a city resident with a non-agricultural household registration, he would 
have to freely return his Contracted Land to the collective, because he is no longer 
a member of the collective and has no right to contract the collective-owned land 
(See Article 26, Land Contract Law of PRC), which constitutes a cost of rural sur-
plus labor to urban residents. Because of this cost, a lot of new city migrants from 
the countryside still retain agricultural household registration. In China in 2011, 
this population was about 311.5 million (the rural population was 656.6 million, 
while the population with agricultural household registration amounted to 968.1 
million (NBSC)). 
The right to transfer is a prerequisite for the optimal allocation of resource. The 
peasants’ right to transfer their land leases is subject to a lot of constraints in China’s 
current rural land system. (1) Agricultural use of land is not allowed to be changed in 
the transfer of the land leases. (2) The transfer deadline can only be limited to the 
remaining term of leases. (See Article 33, Land Contract Law of PRC). (3) Even with-
out changes in agricultural use of land, the land lease can not be transferred without 
the consent of the collective (See Article 37, Land Contract Law of PRC), which gives 
space for the collective invading peasants’ right to transfer. And the land lease can 
only be transferred to peasants (Article 41, Land Contract Law of PRC), which hin-
ders the non-agricultural capital flowing to agriculture. (4) The land leases not in a 
same collective can not be interchanged, even if the interchange is helpful for farm-
ing (See Article 40, Land Contract Law of PRC), which hinders a decline in the cost 
of farming. (5) The land lease cannot be mortgaged (Article 184, The Property Law of 
the PRC), which limits the ability of peasants’ financing.
These restrictions make the transfer of the land lease very difficult. And the 
transfer value is very low, because as mentioned, the peasants’ land leases are in 
insecurity, facing the usurpation of the government, collective, and officials at any 
time (See section 2.1). A large number of peasant-workers go to town to work in ag-
ricultural slack season and come back to farm in agricultural busy season or simply 
let their Contracted Land barren, because they cannot find the transferee, or be-
cause the transfer value is too low. According to the survey, barren land accounted 
for 10 per cent of farmland in Hunan province in 2007, even 40 per cent in some 
villages, such as Binhu village in Hubei province (Yu, 2013). And the peasants’ 
concurrent-business is very costly — the cost and time for going to town and back. 
The expensive urban land resulting from the prohibition of the transfer of col-
lective land for non-agricultural construction (See section 2.1.3) keeps up house 
prices and rents in cities in China today, which raises the cost of living in the city and 
hinders the transfer of rural surplus labor. The average price of housing in China rose 
from ￥1948/m2 in 2000 to ￥5429.9/m2 in 2012 (NBSC); the price is much higher 
in big cities, such as in Peking -￥16,553.5/m2 in 2012 (NBSC), with an increase of 
about 178.7 per cent, and an average annual growth rate of about 14.9 per cent. In 
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2012, per capita disposable income of urban households - ￥24564.7 (NBSC) and 
per capita income of peasant-workers -￥269883 are only enough to buy housing of 
about 4.5m2 and 4.97m2 respectively if not used for consumption.
3. THE DIRECTION OF REFORM
The direction of reform of China’s current rural land system is the peasant pri-
vate ownership.
3.1 Abolishing Collective Ownership
Potential agricultural contracts include three categories: (1) wage contract, 
(2) fixed rent contract, (3) share contract (including input share contract, output 
share contract, and a mix of the both). The transaction cost of the three types of 
contracts is greatly increased, and their efficiency is reduced in the collective own-
ership of rural land compared with that in the private ownership of the land. In the 
agricultural wage contract (The People’s Commune in China in the 1950s to 1970s 
can be seen as a wage contract in the public ownership of land and other important 
agricultural means of production4), it is difficult to measure the individual’s labor 
contribution, because agricultural output is affected by many factors such as land, 
labor, climate and pests (Barzel, 1997, p.42-5). Accurately paying wages accord-
ing to the labor contribution is impossible. Therefore, the members have a strong 
incentive to shirk. The effective supervision is a necessary condition for the ef-
ficiency of the agricultural wage contract. The supervisors having residual right is 
a necessary condition enough for the effective supervision. However, in the wage 
contract under the collective ownership of rural land, the incentive effect of the 
residual right for the supervisors is weak, because the residual right belongs to 
the collective, which results in a lack of supervision and an inefficient agricultural 
wage contract.
In the fixed rent contract, the peasants’ enthusiasm to work is high, because 
they exclusively have the residual right (G. He, 2013), which overcomes the problems 
of high supervision cost and employee’s shirking in the wage contract. But the pre-
ceding analysis shows that the lease in the collective ownership of land has serious 
drawbacks (See chapter 2). 
In the collective ownership of land the share contract and the fixed rent contract 
have the same drawbacks because of the same factors, but the share contract is rare 
3 Based on the average monthly income of peasant-workers in the third quarter of 2012 (NBSC).
4 The difference is that the contract is a voluntary relationship, but the People’s Commune is a forced, 
not a voluntary association of members. The lifetime of members is under the control of the People’s 
Commune. Therefore, the People’s Commune is essentially a forced slavery. Nevertheless, it will be seen 
that the notion of contract is useful in analyzing the People’s Commune.
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because its transaction cost is much higher than the wage contract’s, and the fixed 
rent contract’s in the modern.
The transaction costs of all possible agricultural contracts are higher, the ben-
efits of land lower, and there is more rent dissipation in the collective ownership 
of land than in the private ownership of land. Therefore, abolition of the collective 
ownership of rural land is the requirement to improve the benefits of land and re-
duce the rent dissipation.
3.2 Privatization
The main reasons for privatizing rural land to peasants can be summarized as 
follows: (1) in the peasant private ownership, land rights are clear. And the peas-
ants can protect their land rights from violations of the collective, government and 
officials in accordance with the law. Thus, they have enthusiasm to invest in the 
land.
(2) The right to transfer is a prerequisite for optimal allocation of resources. 
And assets that can be transferred free must be private property. In China today a 
large number of rural surplus labors, small-scale family-farming (diseconomies of 
scale), and lack of capital are the main obstacles to increasing the income of peasants 
and developing agriculture. Overcoming these obstacles is actually equivalent to op-
timal allocation of labor, land and capital. In peasant private ownership of land, the 
peasant-workers can sell or lease their land if they have this intention, which avoids 
the cost of peasants’ concurrent-business (the cost and time for going to town and 
back) and the loss of barren land (net income of farming or rent). And the revenue 
from land sales or rent provides capital and security for peasant-workers. The right 
to transfer over land is particularly important for the peasants without the ability to 
work. The revenue from land sales or rent may be their most important, even only 
source of income. The peasants can get much-needed funds by selling or mortgag-
ing land. Those peasants with a comparative advantage in agriculture can enlarge 
their farm through the purchase or lease of land. Non-agricultural capital can flow 
into agriculture through the purchase or lease of land. Thus, the rural surplus labors 
gradually flow from agriculture. Land is gradually concentrated to individuals and 
organizations with a comparative advantage in agriculture. The obstacles to increas-
ing peasants’ income and developing agriculture in China today are gradually sur-
mounted. In addition, the peasants’ right to transfer their land for non-agricultural 
construction freely in the peasant private ownership of land will break the govern-
ment monopoly on urban construction land in the current land system, which will 
help in reducing urban real estate land prices and rents (a cost of the transfer of 
rural surplus labor), and help the transfer of rural surplus labor.
Generally, there are two ways of privatizing rural land to peasants. One is to di-
rectly convert the tenancy right into ownership of peasants over their current Con-
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tracted Land, homestead, and Reserved Plots5. The other consists of two steps: to 
adjust the peasants’ existing Contracted Land, and then to convert the tenancy right 
into ownership of peasants. As for which way to take, and how to adjust if the second 
option is selected, these issues should be left to peasants themselves to choose (Qin, 
2009), for example, to decide by vote in the village. 
3.3 The Government’s Land Rights
The government’s land rights mainly include the following aspects.
(1) The right to tax land. Taxing land is both an economic right of the govern-
ment, and an important mean of the government to improve the efficiency of land 
use and reduce waste land. The government is entitled to re-introduction of agricul-
tural tax if necessary, although agricultural tax is canceled in China on January 1, 2006. 
Moreover, the government can levy real estate tax, after the privatization of rural land. 
In urbanization, a large part of the land appreciation results from the government in-
vestment in urban infrastructure. A part of the appreciation, therefore, should go to 
the government. After the privatization of rural land, the government can get a part of 
the appreciation through the imposition of land transaction tax and VAT (Wen, 2008).
(2) The right to levy land. Some people believe that the private ownership of land 
may harm the public interest, because the landowner may charge the buyer too much 
in the land transfer for the public interest. Thus they oppose the privatization of rural 
land. Actually, this fear is not necessary, because in case that an agreement between 
the government and the owner could not be reached, the government can apply for 
court compulsory expropriation in the land expropriation for public interest.
Compared with the private right, the public right is strong. In the land expropri-
ation, it is necessary to impose restrictions on the government’s expropriation power 
to prevent the public power from damaging the private right. First, the government’s 
expropriation of private land should be restricted to the purpose of public interest. 
Land outside the purpose of public interest should be allocated directly by the mar-
ket. (Zhang, 2012) 
Second, the government cannot deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law. From foreign experiences, due process of law should be 
defined as follows: the land expropriation authority can issue a compulsory purchase 
order only after a public inquiry and hearing, and approved by the State Council; the 
court has the power to review the legality of the exercise of the expropriation power; 
the dispute shall be submitted to the Land Court and subject to judicial judgment 
when a compensation dispute between the expropriation authority and the landown-
er appears and an agreement cannot be reached.
5 The Reserved Plots are the small plots of land left to the commune members to use in the long-term in the 
Agricultural Collectivization Movement in China in the 1950’s. The peasants have the rights to lifelong 
use and income, but have no right to transfer over this part of the land. This part of the land is exempt 
from the rent and taxes. Its output is entirely owned by the peasant.
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Finally, the government cannot expropriate any private property for public 
use, without reasonable compensation. The compensation should be exactly equal 
to all losses of the owner in the expropriation, in consideration of all relevant fac-
tors, including the use, history, market value of the land, increase in value resulting 
from the government investment, purpose of expropriation, et al.. This compensa-
tion must be higher than the compensation unilaterally decided by the government 
in the current land expropriation system (See section 2.1.3), which helps in saving 
land and improving the efficiency of land use. The restrictions on the purpose of land 
expropriation and the increase in costs of land expropriation can effectively curb the 
government enclosing land.
(3) The right to regulate land use. The government has the power to regulate the 
use of land for the public interest. The government mainly uses plan and law, includ-
ing local and national plans and regulations of land use, environmental regulations, 
building regulations, et al., to regulate the use of land.
(4) The right to inherit the real estate without successor. The real estate without 
legal successor goes to the government on the death of its owner.
4. MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF 
RURAL LAND
Misunderstandings of the private ownership of rural land are a major obstacle to 
privatization. They mainly come from the following aspects.
4.1 The Relation between the Private Ownership of Land and Social 
Stability
The opponents of the privatization of rural land to peasants, such as Wen (2013), 
Jian (2013), and et al., believe that once the rural land is privatized to peasants, a large 
number of peasants may sell their land due to moving into the city in search of work 
(some may sell their land in great need of funds; some without the ability to work may 
live on the revenue from land sales; some may even sell their land because of lazi-
ness). Once they fail to find work and run out of their savings, these landless peasants 
will become unemployed refugees who may endanger social stability. Opponents 
therefore argue that the peasant private ownership of rural land is harmful, and op-
pose the privatization of rural land to peasants.
This view is baseless. It asserts that the peasants are irrational and lack the ca-
pacity to make decisions. Actually, most peasants will not blindly sell their land in the 
peasant private ownership of land precisely because they are rational. The choice is a 
trade-off for a rational peasant. If he chooses to sell his land, it shows that he has no 
other better choice. The peasants who sell their land because of laziness are rare. A 
rational peasant may sell his land only when there is a comparative advantage in non-
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agricultural industries compared with that in agriculture, and only when he believes 
that he will have a stable non-farm income sufficient to sustain his life in future. The 
free trade of land in the private ownership of land, therefore, may bring unemployed 
refugees, but not quite a lot. Moreover, unemployed refugees should get social as-
sistance, unless the reason is laziness. Thus, the fear that the free trade of land in the 
private ownership of land may bring a large number of unemployed refugees, thus 
threatening social stability, is misplaced. The opponents of the privatization of rural 
land to peasants also often prove their aforementioned view by using the following 
historical theory: peasant wars in China’s history are essentially landless peasants’ 
revolution against landowners to get land; the free trade of land in the private owner-
ship of land resulted in a large number of landless peasants. According to Qin (2001, 
2007), this theory is inconsistent with historical reality. Firstly, peasant wars in 
China’s history mainly resulted from the rulers’ heavy exploitation (taxes) of small- 
and medium-sized landowners. The main participants in peasant wars were mainly 
small- and medium-sized landowners rather than landless peasants. Secondly, the 
main reason for a large number of peasants selling their land was unbearable heavy 
land tax. Purchasers of land were mainly the tax-free privileged class. 
4.2 Security Function of Land 
Some opponents of the privatization of rural land to peasants argue that China’s 
current rural land system plays an important role in security for peasants. For ex-
ample, unemployment peasant-workers can return to the countryside to farm (the 
equivalent of unemployment insurance); older peasants can live by farming (the 
equivalent of old-age security). However, a large number of peasants may sell their 
land, losing security, once the rural land is privatized to peasants (X. Zhang, 2013). 
This view is wrong. First, China’s current rural land system does play some role in 
security for peasants, but no one can deny that the peasants should enjoy equal social 
security with urban residents. Second, as mentioned, the peasant private ownership 
of rural land will not result in a large number of peasants selling their land blindly. 
The third, in China’s current rural land system, a lot of constraints on the peasants’ 
right to transfer their land leases make the transfer very difficult and the transfer 
value very low, which severely limits the security function of land to peasants. Poor 
peasants cannot get much-needed medical funds by transferring their land leases. 
Those peasants without the ability to work cannot live on the revenue from the trans-
fer of land leases. The fourth, the security function of land to peasants does not ex-
clude the peasant private ownership of land; on the contrary, it requires the peasant 
private ownership! In the peasant private ownership, poor peasants can get much-
needed medical funds by selling or mortgaging their land, and the peasants without 
the ability to work can live on the revenue from land sales or rent. Finally, it is nec-
essary to control land in peasants’ hands to restrict the collective, government, and 
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officials from violating their land rights, precisely because land is important for most 
peasants in China today (Qin, 2009).
4.3 The Relation between the Private Ownership of Land and the 
Interests of Peasants
Some opponents of the privatization of rural land to peasants believe that with 
the expansion of peasants’ land rights, reaching an agreement on rural public goods 
among peasants becomes more difficult. The expansion of peasants’ land rights, 
therefore, would undermine the rural collective ability to provide public goods for 
peasants and harm the interests of peasants (X. He, 2013). Whether it is so or not, 
it is necessary to perceive the practical role of the collective in China’s current rural 
land system. In China today, the rural collective is a government-run, not autono-
mous organization, whose main responsibility is to execute government decisions 
such as assisting the government in land expropriation. Although some rural collec-
tives may provide some services, such as market services, technical services, and et 
al. for peasants, their role in this area is weak. Moreover, as mentioned, the rural 
collective often violates peasants’ land rights. The peasant private ownership of rural 
land can curb the government, collectives and officials from violating peasants’ land 
rights (See section 3.2). It is therefore helpful to peasants in general, even though it 
can weaken the collective ability to provide public goods for peasants. Moreover, the 
collective is not an efficient organization to provide rural public goods. Peasants can 
cooperate to provide public goods on their own. Provision of rural public goods is 
also an important duty of the government. 
4.4 The Relation between the Private Ownership of Land and Farmland 
Preservation
Some opponents of the privatization of rural land to peasants believe that the 
peasant private ownership can lead to excessive farmland for non-agriculture, en-
dangering food security (X. Zhang, 2013; Jian, 2013). This fear is not necessary. In 
China today the main cause of many non-agriculture farmlands is government’s en-
closing of land, not the peasants’ using or transferring farmlands freely. The peasant 
private ownership of rural land can curb the government enclosed land (see section 
3.2), and is helpful for the protection of farmland and food security. Meanwhile, the 
market can effectively allocate land between agriculture and non-agriculture. If ex-
cessive land for non-agriculture results in the shortage of agricultural products, the 
price of agricultural products will rise and that will automatically curb the land used 
for non-agriculture. In a market economy, the government should improve the value 
of land for agriculture by using agricultural subsidies to protect farmland, not simply 
to restrict, or even deprive the peasants’ rights to use and transfer land.
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5. CONCLUSION
The Household Contract System based on the collective ownership is the main 
content of China’s current rural land system. It is essentially a lease where the collec-
tive (landowner) leases its land to its members to independently farm. The peasant-
owned exclusive residual claim in the lease stimulates peasants’ enthusiasm to work, 
which overcomes the members’ shirking in the People’s Commune. The Household 
Contract System, therefore, is efficient compared with the People’s Commune.
But since the late 1990s, China’s current rural land system gradually exposed 
serious drawbacks, mainly including instability of the peasants’ land use right and 
insecurity of their land income right weakening peasants’ enthusiasm for investment 
in land, and a lot of restrictions on the transfer of peasants’ land leases obstructing 
the flows and optimized allocation of labor, land and capital. 
The drawbacks of China’s current rural land system result mainly from the col-
lective ownership and the government-run nature of the collective. The improve-
ments to this system in the framework of the collective ownership, therefore, can not 
eliminate the drawbacks of this system fundamentally, and may make land owner-
ship more unclear, and the transaction cost higher. And the state ownership of rural 
land faces multi-agent problem (governments at all levels exercise ownership on be-
half of the state), while it may both strengthen the government’s role, and weaken the 
market’s role in the allocation of land.
Direction of the reform of China’s current rural land system is the peasant pri-
vate ownership. In the peasant private ownership, land rights are clear. And the peas-
ants can protect their land rights from violations of any organization or individual in 
accordance with the law. Thus, they have enthusiasm to invest in land. Moreover, the 
right to free transfer over land is a prerequisite for optimal allocation of land, labor 
and capital resources (land flowing to individuals and organizations with a compara-
tive advantage in agriculture; labor and capital flowing between agriculture and non-
agricultural industries). And the land that can be transferred free must be private 
land.
The misunderstanding of the private ownership of land and the resistance from 
the vested interests in the current rural land system are the main obstacle to privatize 
rural land. The reform cannot come and succeed, until the strength of the supporters 
of the reform is over opponents’. Currently, it is necessary to carry out a broad dis-
cussion on the reform of the land system in order to accumulate strength to privatize 
rural land. In the discussion there will be more people (especially the decision-mak-
ers) to recognize the necessity and feasibility of rural land privatization, and to be-
come the supporters of the reform. With the rise of supporters’ strength, even some 
vested interests in the current rural land system may also support the reform due to 
pressure or the awareness of the reform trend.
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